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Abstract This study examines how applicants identiﬁed as Asian, Black
or Hispanic differ in mortgage closing outcomes compared to
the remaining applicants. First, the ﬁndings show that minority
applicants are somewhat less likely to close a loan for purchase,
but equally likely to close a loan for reﬁnance. A more important
question this study addresses is whether minority borrowers have
less efﬁcient closing outcomes. The ﬁndings show no statistical
difference between minority and non-minority applicants. This
indicates that originators do not demonstrate a ‘‘taste for
discrimination’’ by basing their loan approval for minorities on
whether the loan can be proﬁtably sold.
Introduction
LaCour-Little (1999) presents a comprehensive review of the substantial body of
literature addressing whether minorities experience racial discrimination in
obtaining mortgages. The gist of the standard argument is that if mortgages made
to minorities are more proﬁtable at the margin than mortgages made to non-
minorities, minorities are experiencing economic discrimination. A number of
studies lend support to one side, while another set of studies lend support to the
other. Some of these papers address the denial rate of minority mortgage
applications, while others address other issues such as default rates, and losses on
defaulted loans made to minority borrowers. The studies show that minorities are
more often denied ﬁnancing—the questions revolve around whether this is due to
racial prejudices (i.e., non economic factors), or due to minority applicants having
lower credit ratings, incomes or other factors.
This study takes a different tack than has thus far been addressed in the literature.
It assesses how minority status affects mortgage loan closing outcome. First it
addresses whether a minority is less likely to close on a locked loan application.
Given that minority applications are more often denied, it follows that one would
expect to see a lower closing rate. The more substantial contribution of this study
is to assess whether minorities have less economically efﬁcient closing outcomes.
This issue is important, as one potential for economic discrimination, ceteris
paribus, would be to show a tendency to deny minority applications if interest544  McMurray and Thomson
rates rise, but be more likely to accept them if interest rates fall. Under such an
environment, minorities would have less efﬁcient closing outcomes.
Upon application for a residential mortgage, the potential borrower is typically
offered the opportunity to lock in a current interest rate for the proposed loan.
While this lock opportunity need not be taken at the time of application, all
applications must lock before closing, as the paperwork has to be prepared for a
known loan contract. Loan lock periods vary, with 45 and 60 days being the most
common in this data set. After locking, the application becomes part of the
‘‘mortgage pipeline.’’
There are several reasons for a locked application not closing. One reason, of
course, is that the applicant may be denied the loan either because the appraisal
of the property does not support the loan, or the income, employment or credit
history does not meet the lenders standards. Another reason is that the processing
of the documents may not be completed during the lock period, as it may be
difﬁcult to complete all the necessary veriﬁcations during that window.1 Other
reasons include that the applicant may decide to not close because he or she
discovers defects in the property or title. Also some personal situation may occur
during the application period such as change of job or illness so that the applicant
may simply choose not to complete the transaction. Closing or fallout for reasons
mentioned thus far do not appear interest rate related. Another reason for an
applicant to not close a loan is that interest rates may have declined since the lock
date, so it is no longer in the applicant’s best interest to close and the applicant
chooses to ‘‘fall out.’’ The data used here does not provide the reason for fall out.
It may be that the application was denied, or it may be the applicant’s choice, or
it may be that the paperwork could not be completed during the period. This data
cannot directly assess whether minority borrowers are more likely to be denied
the loan. Many previous studies, however, establish that minority borrowers are
denied loans at a higher rate than non-minority. Whether this higher denial rate
is because of discrimination or due to weaker applicants remains an ongoing
debate [see LaCour-Little (1999) for references].
Two earlier studies have assessed the probability of mortgage applications closing.
Rosenblatt and Vanderhoff (1992) appear to be the ﬁrst to publish closing
probability research by directly assessing the probability of a locked application
closing. McMurray and Thomson (1997) present further work using a larger, more
varied, and more detailed dataset. The work presented here uses the McMurray
and Thomson data augmented with racial identiﬁers. In addition to presenting the
probability of a loan closing, this study extends previous work by assessing the
efﬁciency of the closing decision, as this can shed new light on the non-economic
discrimination minorities may face.
 The Data
The data is for applications made to a nationally-oriented mortgage originator
during the January 1990 to January 1995 period, which includes periods of bothRace in Residential Mortgage Closings  545
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rising and falling interest rates. The data set includes FHA, VA and conventional
applications for ﬁxed- and variable-rate mortgages with 15- and 30-year
amortization periods for both purchase and reﬁnance. From about 44,000 loan
applications, there are in excess of 55,000 interest rate locks. Most applications
locked once, but about 9,000 experienced multiple locks. About 43% of the locks
were for 45 days, and 38% for 60 days. Less than 0.2% of the locks were for
greater than 90 days.
Because of the cost of processing applicants, funding during the original lock is
the goal of mortgage originators. Two-thirds (66.54%) were funded during the
original lock period. About 11% of the applicants terminated their application in
this period,2 and the remaining 22% went on to the next phase, either by allowing
the interest rate to ﬂoat for some period (i.e., allowed the lock to expire), or by
securing a new lock, prior to the expiration of the initial lock (9.5% of applicants).
The overall closing rate was 61% for African Americans, 62% for Hispanics, 66%
for Asians and 68% for others.
For this study, two dependent variables were created. To study the probability of
a lock closing, the binary dependent variable, CLOSE, takes the value 1 if the
loan closed during the lock, and 0 otherwise. To address the efﬁciency of closing,
Treasury note futures were used as a reference instrument to measure interest rate
changes and interest rate volatility. Both prices and implied volatilities were
collected for each lock. Treasury note futures were chosen because (1) they have
a similar duration to the most prevalent (i.e., ﬁxed rate) mortgages; (2) market
prices are easily observed and collected; and (3) daily, implied volatilities could
be obtained. The dependent variable used in the efﬁciency analysis is based on
the Treasury note futures. The potential loan loss (LOSS) is measured as:
LOSS  (TF /TF  1) * Loan, (1) T 0
where:
TFT  The price of the Treasury future at the terminal date;
TF0  The price of the Treasury future at the lock date; and
Loan  The loan size (in dollars) of the mortgage applied for.
If interest rates rise, then Treasury futures fall in value, and correspondingly, the
value of the delivered mortgage will be less than the note amount resulting in a
loss to the originator. When interest rates fall, the opposite occurs, assuming the
applicant closes the loan. If the closing process were perfectly efﬁcient, the LOSS
on every closing would be positive. In other words, if the applicants treated the
lock as a pure ﬁnancial option, and interest rates rose, they would close to beneﬁt
from their advantageous note rate. If interest rates fell, they would fall out (i.e.,
apply for a loan somewhere else at a lower interest rate). If applicant-closing
decisions are perfectly random with respect to interest rate, and interest rate546  McMurray and Thomson
changes themselves are random, then LOSS would have an average value of $0.
If there is no interest rate response behavior by applicants, LOSS will be explained
by the interest rate change between lock date and termination date. To control for
the effect of interest rate change on the LOSS measure, a series of quarterly
dummies is employed in the empirical model.
 Empirical Model Variables
With all empirical investigations, one is subject to the richness of the data set
available. In Exhibit 1, data available to this study that are posited to inﬂuence
the closing outcome are described. The loan approval decision typically requires
an assessment of the property, and the employment, income, assets and credit
worthiness of the borrower. Data was not available on the property. The primary
variable relating to the borrowers income, is the payment to income ratio. Many
of the variables describe details of the mortgage applied for or other applicant
characteristics. The ﬁrst noted hypothesized sign is for the probability of the lock
closing. The second hypothesized sign is for the efﬁciency of the closing decision.
Exhibit 2 presents descriptive statistics for these covariates.
 Regression Modeling Results
To address how minority status affects the probability of closing a mortgage loan
application within the lock period, logistic regression is employed because of the
desirable properties of regression analysis and the reasonable restriction to model
closing probabilities in the [0,1] interval. Exhibit 3 presents the regression results.
The ﬁrst column presents the parameter estimate, followed by the estimated p-
value, which in turn is followed with a measure of the impact this variable exerts
on the probability of closing. The baseline probability, from which impact is
measured, is the predicted closing probability when each continuous covariate is
set to its average value (as shown in Exhibit 2), and the dummy variables are set
to zero. This means the baseline probability is the predicted closing probability
of the original lock for a 30-year, ﬁxed-rate conventional mortgage application by
a non-minority married man for an owner occupied single-family dwelling. The
impact measure shows the percentage change (from the baseline probability) in
the estimated closing probability as each continuous covariate value is individually
increased by one standard deviation. For binary variables, the impact measure
shows the effect of the variable taking the value 1. Because some variables that
may be statistically signiﬁcant may not be economically signiﬁcant it is helpful
to provide an impact measure for easy assessment of the economic signiﬁcance
of each covariate in a nonlinear regression model. Because an R-squared measure
does not exist for logistic regression, this paper presents the square of the
correlation between the predicted and actual outcomes, ‘‘correlation squared,’’
which is analogous to the R-squared of linear regression (Maddala, 1988).
For the question at hand, that is, whether minority-closing outcomes are different
than others, the negative regression coefﬁcients for the ﬁrst nine variablesRace in Residential Mortgage Closings  547
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CLOSE N/A The dependent variable for assessing closing probability. An
indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the application
closed, and 0 otherwise.
LOSS N/A The dependent variable for assessing closing efﬁciency. This is
the originator’s dollar loss at closing due to interest rate
change over the lock period. It is either the amount of loss at




Indicator that the applicant is Asian multiplied by indicator that
the loan is conventional. Similar variables are created for
ASIANxFHA (Asian crossed with FHA indicator), ASIANxVA
(Asian crossed with VA indicator) and ASIANxREFI (Asian
crossed with reﬁnance indicator). From previous studies [see
LaCour-Little (1999) for references] it can be seen that minority
applications are more likely to be rejected; thus, it is
hypothesized that they are less likely to close an application. If
minorities feel they are less likely to close a loan, they may be
more inclined to close a loan with poor loan terms (i.e., close
even though interest rates have fallen) and thus experience less
efﬁcient closes.
BLACK-CONV  As above, but for an African American applicant.
HISPANIC-CONV 

As above, but for a Hispanic applicant.
FHA 

Indicator that the loan applied for is an FHA loan. It is
reasonable to expect that an FHA loan program will draw less
qualiﬁed applicants and thus be less likely to close. Also, less
qualiﬁed applicants may be less willing to pursue alternative
closing options and thus experience less efﬁcient closes.
VA ?

Indicator that the loan applied for is a VA loan. Because this
loan program is open only to qualiﬁed veterans it is difﬁcult to
establish priors about its likelihood of closing. If there is a
beneﬁt to a VA loan, closing would be less efﬁcient as a larger
goal will be to capture the beneﬁt of the VA program.
REFINANCE ?

Indicator that the loan sought is to reﬁnance an existing loan.
Because the loan itself is more optional, the likelihood of
closing is not predicted. The closing decisions will be more
efﬁcient as there is little cost to fallout if interest rates fall.
15-YEAR 

Indicator variable for a 15-year amortization period. Those
who apply for a 15-year loan are probably more likely to
qualify for a loan and thus will be more likely to close. Those
who qualify for a 15-year loan are also more likely to consider
their closing option and thus be more efﬁcient in the outcome.548  McMurray and Thomson







Indicator variable for an adjustable-rate mortgage. Those who
apply for an ARM may be doing so due to a weak ﬁnancial
position and thus are both less likely to close, and less likely to
optimally exploit their closing option.
VOLATILITY 

The implied volatility of the reference interest rate instrument.
The higher the volatility of an option, the more likely its
exercise leading to a lower probability of closing and a higher
probability of an efﬁcient closing decision.
DISCPOINT 
?
Amount of discount points an applicant pays. Higher discount
points may erode the applicants ability to close the loan, and
an applicant may have a distaste for paying points, even
though they may be fairly priced, given the note rate. The
effect of discount points on closing efﬁciency is not posited.
LOCKDAYS 

The number of days the interest rate lock is in effect. Because
short locks only make sense if the application process is
nearing the end and the applicant has chosen to proceed with
the lock, short lock periods should indicate a higher closing
probability. The longer the time until expiration of an option,
the greater its time value leading to a positive effect of
lockdays on closing efﬁciency.
PMT/INC 

Payment to income ratio. This variable is the monthly mortgage
payment divided by the monthly family income, assuming the
loan is amortized over 30 years. It measures affordability by
capturing the relationship between income, loan amount and
interest rate. As this ratio rises, affordability falls leading to
lower projected closings. Those with high ratios are posited to
proceed to closing, if it is offered, and thus be less efﬁcient.
SCHOOL 

The maximum years of schooling of the applicant or co
applicant. It is hypothesized that more educated applicants
have higher closing rates as they can better navigate the loan
closing process leading to a higher closing rate overall. This
higher education also suggests these applicants will be savvier




Applicant age. Older applicants will be more likely to
successfully bring a loan to closure due to having had more
experience in completing major ﬁnancial transactions. As




Indicator that the applicant is a female (which does not prevent
a male from being a co-applicant).Race in Residential Mortgage Closings  549
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Indicator that the applicant is single. Singles probably have a
lower opportunity cost in not having a loan close as non-
closure may disrupt only one person. This smaller opportunity
cost of fallout decreases the likelihood of closing a loan, but
increases the likelihood that an efﬁcient close will be made.
RENTAL 

Indicator of a rental unit. Applicant is expected to be less likely
to close as less personal disruption occurs from not closing.
These applicants are expected to be more ﬁnancially motivated
to fall out if interest rates fall resulting in more efﬁcient closes.
MULTIUNIT 

Indicator of a mortgage for a 2–4 unit building. At least one
of the units in a multiunit structure will be a rental, so the rental
affects noted above will be operative.
SHORT-LOCK 
?
Indicator of a short lock period (14 or fewer days). This
variable, combined with LOCKDAYS allows for non-linearity in
the effect of lock days.
SHORT-RELOCK 

Indicator of a short relock period (14 or fewer days).
RELOCK1 

Indictor variable for ﬁrst relock. It seems the most likely reason
for a relock is that the documentation needed to complete the
closing could not be completed during the lock period. The
applicant seems to want to proceed with the loan and thus will
be more likely to close in the second period, and less likely to
treat the lock as an option.
RELOCK2 

Indictor variable for second relock.
RELOCK3

Indictor variable third or greater relock.
Q1-90–Q3-94 N/A
?
Quarterly dummy variables used as control variables in the
LOSS equation. These dummies track the general effect of
interest rate changes on the LOSS variable. If there are no
effects on loss from the above covariates, the determinant of
whether the closing is efﬁcient will be the change in interest
rates during the lock period. If interest rates increase during
the lock period, the closings will be efﬁcient. If interest rates
decrease during the period, the fallouts will be efﬁcient.
(minority interacted with loan program for purchase) presented in Exhibit 3
conﬁrms the expectation that minority applicants are less likely to close a
mortgage application. Only ﬁve of the nine coefﬁcients, however, show statistical
robustness at the usual 5% level of signiﬁcance. The lack of signiﬁcance in some
cases may be due to the low number of observations for some combinations (as550  McMurray and Thomson
Exhibit 2  Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
CLOSE 0.680 0.467 0.00 1.00
LOSS (close) 61.291 1,339.910 16,907.08 21,793.71
LOSS (fallout) 36.126 851.664 13,839.02 13,917.49
ASIANxCONV 0.015 0.121 0.00 1.00
BLACKxCONV 0.016 0.126 0.00 1.00
HISPANICxCONV 0.030 0.171 0.00 1.00
ASIANxFHA 0.008 0.088 0.00 1.00
BLACKxFHA 0.036 0.187 0.00 1.00
HISPANICxFHA 0.044 0.206 0.00 1.00
ASIANxVA 0.001 0.029 0.00 1.00
BLACKxVA 0.012 0.110 0.00 1.00
HISPANICxVA 0.007 0.085 0.00 1.00
ASIANxREFI 0.007 0.081 0.00 1.00
BLACKxREFI 0.008 0.089 0.00 1.00
HISPANICxREFI 0.015 0.120 0.00 1.00
FHA 0.350 0.477 0.00 1.00
VA 0.107 0.310 0.00 1.00
REFINANCE 0.246 0.431 0.00 1.00
15-YEAR 0.129 0.335 0.00 1.00
ARM 0.175 0.380 0.00 1.00
VOLATILITY 6.730 0.905 4.84 11.13
DISCPOINT 0.566 1.294 4.25 9.50
LOCKDAYS 45.492 17.019 0.00 600.00
PMT/INC 0.164 0.074 0.00 3.42
SCHOOL 15.055 2.686 5.00 30.00
AGE 38.031 10.673 18.00 91.00
FEMALE 0.190 0.392 0.00 1.00
SINGLE 0.315 0.465 0.00 1.00
RENTAL 0.035 0.183 0.00 1.00
MULTIUNIT 0.022 0.145 0.00 1.00
SHORTLOCK 0.052 0.222 0.00 1.00
SHORTRELOCK 0.026 0.158 0.00 1.00
RELOCK1 0.165 0.371 0.00 1.00
RELOCK2 0.040 0.196 0.00 1.00
RELOCK3 0.015 0.121 0.00 1.00
Note: N  55,608.Race in Residential Mortgage Closings  551
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Exhibit 3  Logistic Regression Estimates
Variable Coefﬁcient p-value Impact (%)
Intercept 0.5923 0.0001 NA
ASIANxCONV 0.3509 0.0001 9.9
BLACKxCONV 0.2091 0.0071 5.7
HISPANICxCONV 0.1225 0.0545 3.3
ASIANxFHA 0.1432 0.1838 3.9
BLACKxFHA 0.3370 0.0001 9.5
HISPANICxFHA 0.2784 0.0001 7.7
ASIANxVA 0.0499 0.8684 1.3
BLACKxVA 0.2023 0.0174 5.5
HISPANICxVA 0.1344 0.2112 3.6
ASIANxREFI 0.1091 0.4093 2.8
BLACKxREFI 0.0138 0.8985 0.4
HISPANICxREFI 0.0090 0.9199 0.2
FHA 0.2287 0.0001 6.3
VA 0.4318 0.0001 12.4
REFINANCE 0.3934 0.0001 11.2
15-YEAR 0.0094 0.7623 0.2
ARM 0.0747 0.0039 2.0
VOLATILITY 0.0893 0.0001 2.1
DISCPOINT 0.0564 0.0001 1.9
LOCKDAYS 0.0092 0.0001 4.2
PMT/INC 0.9686 0.0001 1.9
SCHOOL 0.0399 0.0001 2.7
AGE 0.0039 0.0001 1.1
FEMALE 0.0757 0.0052 2.0
SINGLE 0.0197 0.3939 0.5
RENTAL 0.3013 0.0001 8.4
MULTIUNIT 0.3514 0.0001 9.9
SHORTLOCK 0.5583 0.0001 12.6
SHORTRELOCK 0.3760 0.0001 8.9
RELOCK1 0.0009 0.9731 0.0
RELOCK2 0.0613 0.2050 1.6
RELOCK3 0.2283 0.0044 5.6
Notes: Logistic regression estimates for factors affecting closing probability. The dependent
variable is CLOSE, which takes the value 1 if the loan closed and 0 otherwise. The average
closing rate is 68.0%, and the baseline-closing rate is 73.8%. The baseline sets all continuous
variables to their mean and all indicator variables to zero. Impact measures the percentage
change in the predicted value for the dependent variable if the continuous variables are increased
by one standard deviation or an indicator variable takes the value 1. Correlation squared 
3.3%.552  McMurray and Thomson
demonstrated by their small means). The impact numbers indicate that minorities
are in the range of 1.3% to 9.9% less likely than others to close a locked
application. The reason for this lower closing rate cannot be determined from this
data, but it is reasonable to speculate that part of the reason is that minorities’
applications are more often denied. HMDA data, as presented by Carr and
Megbolugbe (1993) show the average rejection rate for whites is about 10% and
for minorities in the 20%–25% range. Given that the non minority-closing rate is
68%, it appears that most of the fallout is due to reasons other than rejection. If
the denial rate for minorities in this data were similar to HMDA data, then the
most likely reason not to close a loan would be denial of the application as about
62% of the locks granted to minorities closed.
The next three variables show the results of minority applicants interacted with
the reﬁnance indicator. These results are not statistically different than zero,
indicating that minorities are as likely as non-minorities to close loans for
reﬁnance. This result indicates that minorities, who have closed a loan on this
dwelling in the past, are just as likely to close a loan application for reﬁnance, as
are non-minority applicants. The remaining covariates can be seen as control
variables for the primary question of interest in this study. The effects of the
remaining covariates on loan-closing outcomes are addressed in McMurray and
Thomson (1997).
While analysis of the closing rate sheds little new light on the accept/denial
controversy, the efﬁciency of close results can be exploited to test for a form of
non-economic discrimination. Consider the scenario where the originator has a
‘‘taste for discrimination’’ that it exploits in the following way. Applications from
minorities are taken, and if interest rates fall, so the loan can be sold for more
than the face value, the originator is less likely to reject the applicant. If interest
rates rise, and the loan would have to be sold at a loss, the application is tilted
toward rejected. For non-minority applicants, assume the accept/reject decision is
made without regards to interest rate change. Under such a scenario, the closed
loans would be skewed with proﬁtable minority loans, and the loss coefﬁcient in
the regression equation would be statistically negative (i.e., on average the
originator realizes a gain on minority applicants).
All of the closed loans were approved, so if approval rates were contingent on
falling interest rates, more loans would be seen in this class that were inefﬁcient
for the minority applicant. A statistically robust negative coefﬁcient for the closed
loans of minority applicants, however, would not conclusively reﬂect non-
economic discrimination by the originator. If minority applicants feel they are
more likely to face discrimination in lending, they may also be more likely to
choose to close a loan when interest rates have fallen if they are believe that they
have a lower probability of acceptance if they restart the loan application process
with another originator. So if either the lender tends to skew loans to approval
when interest rates fall, or if minorities are more inclined to accept what turnsRace in Residential Mortgage Closings  553
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out to be a poor lock, statistical inefﬁciency would be observed relative to non-
minority applicants. If inefﬁciency is observed, it cannot be determined whether
it is ‘‘self induced’’ by the applicant who closes a poor lock, rather than risk
searching for another loan, or if lenders are more likely to approve a minority
application when interest rates fall. In either case, lack of statistical difference
indicates non-discrimination.
Consider the closed loans. Exhibit 4 shows one minority variable with statistical
signiﬁcance, ASIANxCONV. The $141.22 regression coefﬁcient means that, on
average, Asians close loans when the value of the loan has fallen by $141.22
relative to when the application was taken (i.e., on average, a small interest rate
rise occurred). In words, this result demonstrates that Asians applying for
conventional loans tend to make efﬁcient closing decisions. For the other minority
groups and other loan programs for purchase, the minority effect is not
signiﬁcantly different than zero. The signs tend to be positive, which represents a
loss for the mortgage issuer, further indicating no discrimination either induced
by the mortgage bank, or the actions of the applicant. For reﬁnance loans, the
signs are negative (i.e., the originator is making a small gain), but the results are
not statistically different than zero at the 5% level of signiﬁcance. Once again,
there is no statistical evidence of racial discrimination.
For the loans that fall out, some are denials, and some fell for other reasons. If
many of the reasons for fall out are not interest rate related (for example the house
does not appraise a value high enough to support the loan), and that denial is rate
is increased for minorities when interest rates rise, inefﬁcient outcomes will be
observed for minorities vis-a `-vis other applicants. In other words, statistically
positive coefﬁcients would provide evidence of such discrimination.
When evaluating the applications that fell out, the conclusion regarding racial
discrimination appears similar to that for the closed loans. The coefﬁcient values
for the minority indicators are positive indicating that if the loans had not fallen
out, the mortgage originator would have incurred no loss if these loans had instead
closed. In many cases the coefﬁcients are similar to those for the closed loans,
indicating no difference between the loans that close and those that fall out—in
other words, the two sets of loans appear no different regarding their efﬁciency
and there is no indication of denial/acceptance depending on interest rates
movements since application. As with the closed loans, the fallout applications
show negative (but non signiﬁcant) regression coefﬁcients for the reﬁnance
applications. There is no evidence of non-economic discrimination in the fallout
applications.
The balance of Exhibit 4, for the purpose of this study, can be thought of as
control variables. Few of the variables demonstrate statistical signiﬁcance,
indicating there must be major frictions in the mortgage pipeline that prevent
applicants from exploiting their closing option in an efﬁcient manner. Mortgage
originators prefer, of course, that closing outcomes be random relative to interest554  McMurray and Thomson






Intercept 5,395.34 0.0001 4,264.68 0.0001
ASIANxCONV 141.22 0.0293 105.98 0.2434
BLACKxCONV 90.34 0.1161 137.39 0.0942
HISPANICxCONV 7.71 0.8679 63.57 0.3536
ASIANxFHA 71.47 0.4032 107.30 0.3251
BLACKxFHA 17.74 0.6733 16.95 0.7348
HISPANICxFHA 43.01 0.2643 58.62 0.2015
ASIANxVA 51.59 0.8394 180.95 0.5429
BLACKxVA 50.96 0.4809 52.59 0.5224
HISPANICxVA 71.18 0.4299 81.86 0.4354
ASIANxREFI 188.82 0.0730 136.49 0.3079
BLACKxREFI 55.69 0.5518 94.33 0.3629
HISPANICxREFI 47.79 0.5081 33.85 0.7049
FHA 1.23 0.9472 85.71 0.0012
VA 69.67 0.0110 73.72 0.0359
REFINANCE 41.77 0.0341 60.65 0.0246
15-YEAR 1.54 0.9469 13.54 0.6726
ARM 67.05 0.0012 23.74 0.3835
VOLATILITY 718.41 0.0001 626.96 0.0001
DISCPOINT 32.60 0.0001 33.01 0.0001
LOCKDAYS 6.56 0.0001 0.31 0.6714
PMT/INC 23.28 0.8312 359.24 0.0022
SCHOOL 6.51 0.0158 14.12 0.0002
AGE 1.16 0.0945 1.52 0.1069
FEMALE 38.94 0.0599 1.92 0.9441
SINGLE 25.18 0.1480 31.80 0.1771
RENTAL 73.16 0.0735 60.47 0.2472
MULTIUNIT 35.57 0.5055 40.14 0.4950
SHORTLOCK 201.00 0.0001 78.18 0.2323
SHORTRELOCK 201.75 0.0001 73.14 0.3869
RELOCK1 20.93 0.2927 8.82 0.7404
RELOCK2 64.32 0.0746 7.22 0.8860
RELOCK3 166.84 0.0033 0.08 0.9992
Q1-90 1,143.18 0.0001 1,154.17 0.0001
Q2-90 66.33 0.2715 21.08 0.7960
Q3-90 19.14 0.7316 56.35 0.4670
Q4-90 936.96 0.0001 1,269.23 0.0001
Q1-91 133.54 0.0179 103.67 0.1666
Q2-91 903.49 0.0001 947.12 0.0001
Q3-91 46.72 0.4306 286.82 0.0003
Q4-91 82.62 0.1368 406.43 0.0001
Q1-92 266.26 0.0001 297.09 0.0001
Q2-92 785.94 0.0001 967.37 0.0001Race in Residential Mortgage Closings  555
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Q3-92 573.96 0.0001 659.58 0.0001
Q4-92 380.68 0.0001 512.71 0.0001
Q1-93 953.71 0.0001 916.03 0.0001
Q2-93 354.88 0.0001 242.15 0.0003
Q3-93 271.17 0.0001 231.49 0.0004
Q4-93 1,405.38 0.0001 1,230.53 0.0001
Q1-94 2,673.04 0.0001 1,844.03 0.0001
Q2-94 597.33 0.0001 658.51 0.0001
Q3-94 209.76 0.0001 269.85 0.0003
Notes: OLS regression estimates for factors affecting closing efﬁciency. The dependent variable,
LOSS, is described in Equation 1. The loans are separated into those that closed and those that
fell out. N  37,786 for closed loans; N  17,822 for fallout loans. Adjusted R2  32.5% for
closed loans and 26.7% for fallen loans.
rate changes, and to simply close as many applications as possible to make their
overall business as proﬁcient as possible.
 Conclusion
There remains great debate regarding whether minorities face discrimination in
mortgage lending. Since the advent of the ‘‘Boston Fed’’ study (Munnell, Browne,
McEneaney and Tootell, 1992), many studies that address this issue evaluate the
denial rates of minority applicants, though some have also addressed the default
and foreclosure process. This study takes a different look at this issue. First this
article shows that the likelihood of closing a mortgage loan for purchase is from
1.3% to 9.9% lower for minorities, depending on which minority group or which
type of loan is being studied. This is not prima facie evidence of discrimination,
however, as there are many reasons for not closing, and the data at hand could
not determine the reason for not closing. The closing rate for reﬁnance applications
was not statistically different between minority and others. More importantly, this
study tests for a form of non-economic discrimination than can be detected by
assessing the efﬁciency of the closing outcome. If mortgage originators practiced
the differential treatment of being more likely to approve minority applications
when interest rates fall (and the loans could be sold at a gain), and less likely to
approve when interest rate go up, minority closing results would be found to be556  McMurray and Thomson
less efﬁcient. The empirical results show no evidence of discrimination using the
efﬁciency analysis, as there is no statistical difference in closing efﬁciency for
minority applicants.
 Endnotes
1 A recent Wall Street Journal article warned mortgage applicants to choose longer lock
periods due the current high demand for home mortgages (Simon, 2002).
2 The mortgage originator regularly contacted applicants and thus can rapidly be
determined when the applicant withdrew his or her application.
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